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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DOUGLAS CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

:
:
:

Criminal No. 9707
Supreme Court No. 860063

:
:
:

Argument Priority
Classification No. 1

:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I. Whether defense counsel's representation was so ineffective as
to violate the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June. 14, 1985 the Defendant appeared with counsel
before

the

Eighth

Circuit

Court

for

Utah

County,

Department. On that occasion the Defendant represented

Provo

that he

had retained counsel, an attorney from Chicago, Illinois (R. 5 ) .
Retained counsel represented the Defendant at preliminary hearing
on

July

25,

arraignment

1985
and

and
trial

again

appeared

setting

(R.

with

the Defendant

3 0 ) . Defense

at

counsel

represented to the court that it would file a motion to suppress
a statement
motion

given

by the Defendant

and that

it would

file a

for a change of venue. The matter was set for trial on

October 3, 1985. On September 27, 1985, the public

defender's

office at the request of Defendant's retained counsel moved that
the trial date be continued to insure that Defendant's retained

1

counsel had enough time to file the proposed motions on the
Defendant's behalf. A new trial date was set for December 12,
1985.
On November 29, 1985, defense counsel filed

motions to

suppress and change venue. He also gave notice of the defense's
intention to present an insanity defense or in the alternative
the defense of diminished capacity (R. 35-54). The Defendant was
not at the hearing when these notices and motions were presented
to the court (R. 55). Defendant maintains that he did not consult
with counsel when the alienists were appointed and should have
consulted with counsel prior to speaking with these individuals.
On December 2, 1985, an order appointing two alienists was signed
by the Court (R. 56). On December 11, 1985, the defense counsel
withdrew the notice of insanity defense or in the alternative the
defense of diminished capacity (R. 64, 415-422). The prosecutor
objected to the defense counsel's withdrawal of notice and argued
that a hearing should be held to determine that the Defendant was
competent to proceed to trial (R. 417). Defense counsel in
response stated that ". . . the defense does not choose to
advocate or go ahead with that as a defense and, certainly, upon
perusing the evaluation."

The Defendant acknowledged to the

court' s- questions that he was in agreement with his counsel's
actions (R. 419). His counsel made no effort to obtain an
evaluation by an independent examiner.
The Defendant used heroin or LSD daily for about five years
during the 70fs (R. 1412). The Defendant has an I.Q.
2

of 75 which

falls within the borderline range of an intellectual ability. The
full scale I.Q. score places him in the 5th percentile (R. 1424).
Both mental evaluation reports were introduced during the penalty
phase of the trial by the defense counsel

for the purpose of

presenting Defendant's background to the jury (R. 1411-29).
Other

than

Defendant's

prepare

counsel

the motions
did

not

for

engage

the Defendant,
in

other

the

extensive

investigation. He made no motion for discovery nor did he make an
effort to examine evidence held by the county attorney (R. 13004).

He did

not

attempt

Defendant's motion
made

an

attempt

to get

expert

testimony

supporting

for change of venue. Defense counsel never

to obtain

the

tape

recording

made

of

the

Defendant at the time he gave his statement to determine if it
corresponded

with

the statement

that

the Defendant

made

to

Detective Pierpont.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant

has a right to effective assistance of counsel.

Defendant's counsel was ineffective in that he failed to advise
Defendant of the consequences arising from his interview with the
two alienists appointed by the court; in that he failed assert
and maintain Defendant's defense of diminished capacity and that
defense counsel
contained

later

repeated

introduced

denials

of

the mental evaluations which
the

offense

which

greatly

prejudiced the jury against the Defendant.
These errors cumulatively prejudiced

the Defendant's case.

If counsel had persisted in these defenses, it is possible that

3

the Defendant would not have received the death penalty but life
imprisonment.
POINT I
WHETHER

DEFENSE

INEFFECTIVE

COUNSEL'S

REPRESENTATION

AS TO VIOLATE

THE

DEFENDANT'S

WAS SO
SIXTH

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
It

is

the

effective
Const.
fair

fundamental

assistance

Article
trial

especially

I,

of

every

counsel.

Section

itself
true

of

right

12.

would

Without

be

in a c a p i t a l

U.S.

of

little

case.

Defendant

Const.

84 L . E d .

is
377

fair.

counsel,

the

IV;

Utah

the right

to a

consequence.

The a c c u s e d

Avery v . Alabama,

have

Article

This

is entitled

a s s i s t e d by an a t t o r n e y who h a s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
the t r i a l

to

is

to

be

to insure

that

308 U . S . 4 4 4 , 60 S . C t .

321,

(1940).

The United States Supreme Court has opined that in order to
establish ineffective representation, the Defendant must
both incompetence and prejudice.
strong presumption

prove

With respect to incompetence, a

exists that defense counsel's performance is

within the range of professional assistance unless the Defendant
proves otherwise.

The Defendant bears the burden of proving that

counsel's representation

was inadequate under

the prevailing

standards of the legal profession and that the challenged action
was

not

sound

strategy.

The

reasonableness

of

counsel's

performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the
time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.
The standard of review is highly deferential to the attorney who

4

has reasonably exercised his judgment on behalf of the Defendant.
Kimmelman

v. Morrison,

U.S.

106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed2d 305

(1986).
Further the Defendant must show that he is prejudiced by his
attorney's

ineffectiveness

reasonable

probability

errors,

the

factfinder

by demonstrating

that there is a

that, but for counsel's
would

have

had

professional

a reasonable

doubt

respecting his guilt.
Utah's constitutional standard under Article I, Section 12
appears to be similar to the federal standard. State v. Frame,
723 P.2d 401 (Utah, 1986).
Effective

assistance

does

not

attach

only

affecting determination of actual guilt at trial.

to matters
To deprive a

Defendant of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more
damaging than the denial of counsel during

trial.

A defense

lawyer has the obligation to investigate the case and a failure
to conduct
ineffective

adequate

pretrial

investigation

assistance of counsel claim.

can

support

an

For example, counsel

can be guilty of ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
investigate the seriousness of mental problems from which the
Defendant may be suffering. Mental evaluation of a Defendant is a
critical stage at which the Defendant has a right to counsel. A
defense attorney should not be allowed to automatically hide his
failure to investigate, advise and prepare a viable defense by
simply raising the shield of trial tactic or strategy.
The

Defendant

now

asserts

5

that

his

counsel

erred

in

withdrawing his defense of diminished capacity or insanity. The
psychological evaluations indicate that the Defendant has a I.Q.
of 75 with

borderline intellectual capabilities.

counsel's judgment that these evaluations

He relied on

were authoritative and

conclusive. His counsel had months to seek an outside evaluation
on the issue of mental competency.

Yet his defense counsel at

the last moment, fourteen days before trial requested that mental
status evaluation be conducted. Normally thirty days is given for
these evaluations. Here, the doctors evaluated the Defendant in a
few days and returned

reports. Neither

doctor had a time to

observe the Defendant for any length of time and defense counsel
had no time to seek an independent second opinion. Rather defense
counsel advised his client that he should withdraw his notice of
these two defenses.
Defense counsel's actions clearly prejudiced the Defendant.
Had

the Defendant

presented

his defense

it would

have

been

possible for the jury to conclude that he did not have the intent
to commit the offense for which he was charged.
Defense
discovery

counsel's

was

clearly

failure
below

to

the

investigate -and request
levels

of

professional

competence. Counsel failed to request discovery and evaluate the
evidence in the hands of the State. He admitted he was surprised
the State's evidence
thoroughly

and was unprepared

for it. He failed to

investigate his client's mental status and

withdrew

his client's notices when he was not prepared to go forward with
his presentation. He failed to properly investigate his client's
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background
greatly

and introduced

the mental status evaluations which

influenced the jury because of the Defendants repeated

denials of the crime. These denials were the product of an illadvised

client who was unaware of how he should respond to the

questioning

of these medical personnel. Each of these failures

prejudiced

the client

to

a small

degree

but

prejudiced

the client before the jury so that they returned a

sentence of death rather than life imprisonment.
had

counsel

fully

prepared

cumulatively

It is possible

his case, the jury would

have a

reasonable doubt as to whether the death sentence would have been
imposed.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant

did

not

receive

effective

assistance

of

counsel and the case should be remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

? £ - day of July, 1987.

GARY'H. WEIGHT
"^
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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